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Abstract  
Can applying e-gov increase African countries’ FDI inflows? While e-gov has been proved to improve 
various aspects of governance, the link between e-gov and FDI inflows seems to be ignored by previous 
literature. At the same time, as an emerging economy, China’s outward FDI has increased steadily in 
recent years. However, China’s OFDI flows to Africa is relatively low compared with the flows to Asia 
and other industrialised economies. Leveraging the current literature, this study used institutional 
factors by Kaufmann and indices of ease of doing business to explore how each institutional factor 
influenced by e-gov affect FDI inflows from China. This research argues that to attract more China’s 
FDI, African countries should invest in those factors which can influence FDI inflows, such as staring a 
new business and paying taxes. This study contributes to the literature by revealing the most influence 
factors for African countries to invest e-gov in to attract China’s OFDI.  
 
Keywords: E-gov, Institutional Quality, Ease of doing business, China’s FDI, Africa, 
International Business, OFDI, E-governance 
 
 
1 Introduction  
The benefits of electronic governments (e-gov) on institutional quality of a country, 
such as reducing search and coordination costs, paper handling and wait for business 
start-up (Veiga, Janowski, & Barbosa, 2016) and reducing corruption (Arwati & Latif, 
2019) have encouraged more public organisations to embrace it. However, whether 
applying e-gov in host countries can attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 
outside is still the myth. For developing regions, like African countries, FDI plays an 
essential role in their economy. The foreign direct investment makes a more significant 
contribution to economic growth than domestic investment by driving the technology 
spillover effect from developed countries to developing countries (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Kahouli & Maktouf, 2015). However, because of poor 
infrastructures and weak institutions, namely 2% of global FDI flows to African 
countries (Asiedu, 2006; De Maria, 2009; Rodríguez‐Pose & Cols, 2017). Therefore, it 
is necessary to explore whether and how the application of e-gov can influence their 
institutional quality and further affect the FDI flows to host countries.   
There have been many theoretical and empirical studies on how the institutional quality 
of host countries can influence the inflow of FDI. Most previous studies refer the 
institutional quality to the framework developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2009) which includes six factors: voice and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; regulatory quality; the rule of law; control of corruption and 
government effectiveness. Recently, a new index which is developed and measured by 
the world bank also has a relationship with e-gov. This index measure how easy to start 
and operate a local firm in the economy and it is measured based on the Distance to 
Frontier (DTF) of ten sub-indices including starting a new business; dealing with 
construction permits; getting electricity; registering property; getting credits; protecting 
minority investors; paying taxes; trading across borders; enforcing contracts; resolving 
insolvency (The World Bank, 2018a). It can be predicted that the higher score of "ease 
of doing business" index in the host country, more investors are willing to invest in this 
country because it means the operating costs of the business will be lower than those in 
countries with a lower score. With the index, Linda and João (2018) note that e-gov 
help businesses owners by decreasing bureaucratic procedures, and by disseminating 
good practices related to transparency and accountability.  
However, there is scarce research discussing whether the e-gov with the country can 
attract more FDI and few empirical studies take this factor into account with the other 
six factors when analysing the effect of "institutional quality" on FDI inflows. Although 
there are a few researchers who investigate the impact of ten sub-indices of “ease of 
doing business” index on FDI inflows, most of them use static analysis rather than 
dynamic panel data regression analysis.  
To address the literature gap, this research will take Chinese FDI to African counties as 
an example to explore whether the e-gov can help African counties on attracting more 
investment in the future and fatherly to cope with slow growth, poverty and inequality. 
The primary objective of this research is to analyse the panel data (including cross-
sectional and time-series data) across 22 African countries for the period 2007-2016 to 
explore whether and how the sixteen individual institution indicators in African 
countries can impact on China's OFDI inflow. 
The main contribution of this study is 2-fold. First, this study enriches the insight of 
how the institution of host countries in Africa can attract China’s investors by 
combining the ten sub-indices with the traditional Kaufmann’s framework and by using 
dynamic panel data analysis. The results have a direct implication to African countries 
attempting to attract greater FDI from China. Establishing the right policies based on 
the differences becomes imperative. Second, this study can provide practical 
implications and suggestions for African countries to decide which institutional field to 
invest e-gov resources to, by providing the different impacts of individual indicators. 
 
2 Literature review  
2.1 Link between e-gov and institutional quality 
The application of e-gov may increase institutional quality-related factors, such as 
government effectiveness and also improve the business environment, such as ease of 
doing business. There have been various studies on how e-government can influence 
the institutional quality in those countries. An effective e-gov system can reduce the 
burden of starting a new business and other business activities. Martins and Veiga 
(2018) conduct a panel analysis across over 160 countries. They argue that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between e-gov and six Ease-of-Doing-Business 
indices, such as starting a new business and getting credit. Ebenezer (2018) also prove 
that applying e-gov in a country can make starting a new business and paying taxes 
easier. However, the influence of e-gov adoption in different regions, such as Africa, 
can be distinct. de Oliveira Almeida and Zouain (2015)  
 
Besides the research on the influence of e-gov on ease of doing business, scholars have 
also paid attention to other institutional factors. Zouain, Almeida, and Sato (2013) 
conduct a panel analysis and claim that the preparation of e-gov can lead to a dynamic 
business environment and less perception of corruption level.  
 
To decide what specific e-gov system African countries should invest, exploring the 
link between individual, institutional factors and FDI inflows should not be ignored. 
 
2.2 Link between institutional quality and FDI inflows 
In the modern era, China began to reintegrate with the global economy with the ‘Open 
Door' policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping (Peter J Buckley et al., 2010). After Deng 
Xiaoping, the Chinese government did not change its principals of involvement with 
other countries, such as mutual benefits, compliance with obligations, provision of 
equipment made in China, etc. (Chaponnière, 2009; Larkin, 1971). In 1971, Africa was 
a critical player in securing China's membership at the United Nations (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2012). After the Tiananmen Square event in 1989, the international community isolated 
China who urgently needed allies to combat against the America and China also 
required natural resources to support its rapid economic growth (Campbell, 2008). In 
2006, China published the China Africa Policy encapsulating all aspects of the 
relationship between China and Africa (Van Dijk, 2009). Although the China Africa 
policy did provide a specific action plan on how to accomplish the goals, it did show 
that China decided to maintain the relationship with Africa in a long-term (Van Dijk, 
2009). Kolstad and Wiig (2012, p. 34) mention that "FDI, trade, and aid represent the 
key economic channels of interaction between China and African countries". The three 
flows are interlinked, and the interaction of three flows are essential to understanding 
the impact of Chinese investment in Africa (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012).  
 
Between 2005 and 2016, Chinese investors had invested 293 FDI projects which valued 
at US$66.4 billion (Ernst & Young, 2017). As China's OFDI kept increasing during the 
last decade, a common agenda in literature is how institutional quality and political risk 
of host countries can attract China's OFDI. Traditional internationalisation theories 
suggest that poorer institutional quality is generally associated with a lower level of 
FDI inflows because high political risk and low institutional quality mean the increased 
uncertainty and sunk costs of international firms (Peter J. Buckley & Casson, 1998; 
Chakrabarti, 2001). While there are many measurements of institutional quality in 
literature, most previous studies use the framework developed by Kaufmann et al. 
(2009) which includes six factors: voice and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and 
control of corruption. Thus, for government effectiveness, Kaufmann et al. (2009) use 
"government effectiveness" cluster to measure the ability of the government in 
producing and implementing good policies and delivering public goods. This factor 
includes "the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence and independence of the civil service, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to policies"(Kaufmann et al., 2009, p. 255). Many empirical 
studies believe that government effectiveness can significantly impact the growth and 
productivity of the country Globerman and Shapiro (2003); (Rodrik, 1999) Naudé and 
Krugell (2007). Therefore, it is reasonable to note that the factor "government 
effectiveness” can significantly influence the inflow of FDI, and the first hypothesis is 
as follow: 
 
   Hypothesis 1: Government effectiveness in an African country is positively related 
to the inflows of China’s FDI. 
 
Howell (2011) defines control of corruption is an assessment on how well a host 
country can control their corruption within the political system, and he explains that 
bribery may impede foreign investment by reducing the efficiency of government and 
by introducing instability. Concerning the effect of corruption on China's FDI to Africa, 
Cheung, De Haan, Qian, and Yu (2012) present a negative correlation between 
corruption and the inflow of China’s OFDI. However, some empirical studies show 
different results on the effect of corruption. For example, Gu (2009) and Shan, Lin, Li, 
and Zeng (2018) claim that the high level of corruption in Africa does not hinder 
Chinese investors. Although Habib and Zurawicki (2002) explains that Chinese 
investors understand how to take advantage of corruption to achieve goals, Kwok and 
Tadesse (2006) note that the instability and uncertainty caused by corruption can 
involve hidden costs which can concern foreign investors. Asiedu (2006) uses panel 
data for 22 countries over the period 1984-2000 and agrees that the corruption level can 
have an adverse effect on promoting FDI inflows. Thus, we present the second 
hypothesis as below: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Control of corruption in an African country is positively related to 
China’s FDI to that country.  
 
To discuss the specific relations between e-gov and attacking FDI, we extend a new 
institutional factor, called “ease of doing business” which is developed and measured 
by The World Bank (2018a). The World Bank Group has been collecting data and 
ranking 190 economies across the globe on their ease of doing business since 2003. 
Ease of doing business can help decision-makers, including government policymakers, 
business owners, and investors understand the business environment in an economy 
from a new perspective. Although the World Bank does not declare that the 
improvements in the ranking can help countries attract more FDI (Jayasuriya, 2011), 
much empirical research has confirmed the positive relationship between the "ease of 
doing business" ranking and the inflows of FDI from other countries. Bartels, Alladina, 
and Lederer (2009) even note that without an improved rank of the ease of doing 
business, there is no point to offer incentives to attract FDI. However, some scholars 
express some doubt on the link between the ease of doing business rank and the inflows 
of FDI. Corcoran and Gillanders (2015) analyse how ease of doing business can 
influence the FDI inflows in 36 Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries and claim 
that the significance of the relationship between the two occurs only in middle-income 
nations but not in Sub-Saharan African. Therefore, it is critical to examine whether the 
ease of doing business rank can influence the location decision of the investors from 
China. At the same time, not all the factors in the ease of doing business index related 
to the e-gov, this research will make the hypothesis which is only associated with the 
e-gov.  
 
According to The World Bank (2018b), this index “measures the paid-in minimum 
capital requirement, number of procedures, time and cost for a small- to medium-sized 
limited liability company to start up and formally operate in economy’s largest business 
city”. The higher score of this index means the lower costs of starting a business (The 
World Bank, 2018b). Thus, we made our third hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The ease of starting a new business is positively related to the inflows 
of China’s FDI. 
 
As The World Bank (2018b) notes, the score of dealing with construction permits can 
measure how easy to build a warehouse in an economy, including “obtaining the 
necessary licences and permits, submitting all required notifications, requesting and 
receiving all necessary inspections and obtaining utility connections” (The World 
Bank, 2018b). The e-gov can significantly reduce the dealing time and cooperation cost 
due to the development of ICT (Veiga et al., 2016). Thus, a better score of the index 
means fewer costs of obtaining all required building licences and better building 
quality. For those profit-driven investors, a higher score of this index can increase their 
profitability. Thus, we predict that the lower cost of obtaining construction permits can 
attract Chinese investors, and this leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The ease of dealing with construction permits is positively related to 
the inflows of China’s FDI. 
 
Getting electricity measures how easy for a new warehouse to connect to permanent 
electricity The World Bank (2018b). Geginat and Ramalho (2015) use the fixed effects 
model for a cross-sectional dataset to examine the correlation between better electricity 
connection process and firm performance by using total sales as a measure of output. 
They find that firms perform better, where it takes fewer costs and time to obtain a 
reliable electrical connection. Geginat and Ramalho (2015) also mention that some 
industries which rely heavily on electricity, such as manufacturing refined petroleum, 
are even more likely influenced by the ease of getting electricity connection than other 
sectors. Thus, this study predicts that:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The ease of getting electricity is positively related to the inflows of 
China’s FDI. 
 
Getting credit examines how strong the credit reporting systems in an economy are and 
how effective collateral and bankruptcy laws regarding lending are (The World Bank, 
2018b). This index matters a lot to financial lenders. They are least likely to provide 
credit if there is no legal system to enable them to collect debt or collateral with low 
transaction costs, or in other words, with a cost-effective process (The World Bank, 
2018b). With a higher ranking of getting credit index, it is easier and less costly for 
entrepreneurs to obtain funds or resources for growth.  
 
  Hypothesis 6: The ease of getting credits is positively related to the inflows of 
China's FDI. 
 
Paying taxes measures how much taxes and other mandatory contributions a medium-
size company in an economy should pay in a given year, as well as records the tax 
administration (The World Bank, 2018b). Within the e-gov, it is easier to check how 
much tax the investor should pay, which also integrate the government and the investors 
by using technology. The ranking of ease of paying taxes is determined by their distance 
to frontier scores like other factors and firms in an economy with a higher ranking are 
most likely to consider tax rates as less of a barrier to their business (Djankov, Ganser, 
McLiesh, Ramalho, & Shleifer, 2010; Romer & Romer, 2010; The World Bank, 
2018b). The index is essential for both the design of tax policy and economic growth 
(Barro, 1991; Baumol, Litan, & Schramm, 2007; Summers, Bosworth, Tobin, & White, 
1981). Therefore, we predict that the improvement of host countries paying taxes index 
can attract more FDI from Chinese investors and developed the hypothesis as below:  
 
Hypothesis 7: The score of “paying tax” index is positively correlated with the 
inflows of China’s FDI. 
 
3 Methodology  
The researcher gathered the panel data from 22 African countries across ten years 
period (2007-2016). Due to the benefits of panel data analysis, this study used the panel 
datasets gathered from the Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, the World Bank Database, the International Country Risk Guide for 22 
sample African countries across ten years period. Table 1 presents the dependent and 
independent variables used in the estimation. 
 
 
Variables Proxy for Sources 
Dependent variable 
OFDI 
 
The stock of China's outward 
FDI to each African country 
 
SBCOFDI 
Independent variables 
va 
 
Voice and accountability 
ICRG 
pv Political stability and 
absence of violence 
ICRG 
ge Government effectiveness ICRG 
rq Regulatory quality ICRG 
rl Rule of law ICRG 
cc Control of corruption ICRG 
stab Starting a business WB 
conspermit Dealing with construction 
permits 
WB 
getelect Getting electricity WB 
regprop Registering property WB 
getcredits Getting credits WB 
protminoinvest Protecting minority investors WB 
paytax Paying taxes WB 
tradeborder Trading across borders WB 
enforcecon Enforcing contracts WB 
resinv Resolving insolvency WB 
   
 
Table 1: Main variables used  
Notes: SBCOFDI: Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment; WB: 
World Bank Database; ICRG: International Country Risk Guide, the sample period is 2007-
2016 (annual)  
 
3.2 Discussion of variables 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the stock of China’s FDI flowing to the sample of 22 African 
countries from 2007-2016. The data was from the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment. We chose the stock instead of net flows of China's FDI because the stock of FDI 
is a sufficient measurement of how the host countries can create a satisfying business and investment 
environment for foreign investors. 
Explanatory variables 
The six other variables (voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law and control of corruption) are the 
traditional way to measure the institutional quality of a country. The data of all six indices are drawn 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by Political Risk Services (PRS). ICRG is a 
methodology adopted by the PRS group (The PRS group, 2017). This research used the Distance to 
Frontier (DTF) figure of ten indices measured by the World Bank as the proxies for ease of doing 
business. The data are extracted from the database of the World Bank group.  
3.3 Model and robustness test 
According to the hypotheses developed in the literature review, the central estimate 
equation of this research is present as follows: 
 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎!𝑠	𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼	𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘"
=	𝛼" + 𝛽#𝑣𝑎 +	𝛽$𝑝𝑣 +	𝛽%𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽&𝑟𝑞 + 𝛽'𝑟𝑙 +	𝛽(𝑐𝑐 +	𝛽)𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏
+ 𝛽*𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽+𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽#,𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽##𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽#$𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽#%𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽#&𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛽#'𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽#(𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑣 +	𝜀" 
 
where 𝛼"  denotes the unobserved effect, 𝜀"  refers to the error item, and 𝛽"  means the 
coefficients of all variables in the estimation. 
 
As the researcher expect non-linearities in the correlation based on theory and previous 
empirical studies, the author applies the natural log transformation to the variables to 
conduct the regression analysis (Peter J Buckley et al., 2010). Benoit (2011) suggests 
that, in a regression model, when there is a non-linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables, logarithmically transforming variables is a very 
commonly used method which can make non-linear relationship effective while still 
keeping the linear model. 
 
There are four possible combinations of logarithm transformation (Benoit, 2011): 
1) 𝑌" = 	𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋" (the original linear case) 
2) 𝑌" = 	𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋" (linear-log transformation) 
3) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌" = 	𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋" (log-linear transformation) 
4) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌" = 	𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋" (log-log transformation) 
 
The researcher used log-log natural logarithmical transformation where the base is e » 
2.71828. After the transformation, the estimate equation is now: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎′𝑠	𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼	𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖
=	𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑣𝑎 +	𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑣 +	𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑞 +	𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑙 +	𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑐
+	𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑎𝑥
+ 𝛽14𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽15𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽16𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑣 +	𝜀𝑖 
 
As we discussed above, using panel data analysis can help researchers eliminate 
unobserved effects. There are two popular methods to accomplish it: fixed effects and 
GLS random effect regression. As Wooldridge (2015, p. 485) defines, “a pooled OLS 
estimator that is based on the time-demeaned variables is called the fixed effects or the 
within estimator” and he continues to define a random effect model as a model when 
the unobserved effect 𝛼! is uncorrelated with each independent variables. The next 
question is when to use fixed effects and when to use random effects. Hausman (1978) 
first proposed a test called the Hausman test for the choice of fixed effects or random 
effects. The null hypothesis of the test is that the difference in coefficients is not precise, 
meaning random effects are better than fixed effects in this model. Table 2 below shows 
the results of the Hausman test of the regression model in the study. It shows the p-
value for this test is .0000, meaning we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative hypothesis that fixed effects (FE) are better than random effects (RE) in this 
study.  
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 Chi2(16)     =  (b-B) ‘ [(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) 
                    = 128.12 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Table 2: Hausman test results 
 
Before the regression, this study first examined whether the multicollinearity issue 
exists. According to Wooldridge (2015), multicollinearity issue occurs when there is a 
high correlation between two or more dependent variables in the model. It is clear that, 
for estimation, it is better to have less correlation between explanatory variables when 
everything else is equal (Wooldridge, 2015). Therefore, we produced the correlation 
matrix, as shown in Table 3 to examine the correlation between all 16 independent 
variables. Although Wooldridge (2015) notes that it is difficult to define how much 
correlation among independent variables is too much. He continues to argue the most 
common threshold used by International Business study agenda is 0.80, meaning if the 
correlation between two variables is above 0.80, we can claim the two variables are 
highly related. According to the correlation matrix, multicollinearity should not be an 
issue in the estimation because the all correlation among the 16 independent variables 
are below the 0.80 threshold. Therefore, we can conduct the regression. 
Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
4.0 Results and discussion 
The preliminary results from the regression with fixed effects model, using sixteen independent 
variables is shown in Table 4.  
 
Variables Coefficient 
Kaufmann’s framework  
       lninv     0.2205   0.0329   0.1160   0.6075   0.1432   0.3480   0.2018   0.3251   0.1557   0.0507   0.0167   0.0060   0.0731   0.1365   0.2810   1.0000
       lnenf     0.1938   0.0635   0.2761   0.2995   0.4226   0.3348  -0.1337   0.1102   0.3712   0.2031   0.3158   0.0080   0.1681   0.0470   1.0000
     lntrade     0.0701   0.2201   0.1416   0.3906  -0.0345   0.2384   0.3869   0.1135   0.0764  -0.1005  -0.1014   0.0218  -0.1995   1.0000
       lntax     0.3531   0.0529   0.1820  -0.0447   0.1620   0.1959   0.0738   0.0049  -0.0171   0.5102   0.2689   0.5371   1.0000
      lnprot     0.6057   0.3475   0.0290   0.0553  -0.2676   0.2199   0.5628  -0.0824  -0.1194   0.1708   0.4371   1.0000
      lngetc     0.3792   0.2118   0.3327  -0.0186   0.0417   0.1998   0.1950   0.3158   0.3715   0.2435   1.0000
       lnreg     0.0531   0.2437   0.4268   0.0051   0.2056   0.1649  -0.0672   0.0809   0.1835   1.0000
      lngete     0.1467   0.2933   0.1556   0.1701   0.2707   0.2216   0.0292   0.2844   1.0000
      lncons     0.2821   0.2113   0.2658   0.4208   0.0782   0.3934   0.1432   1.0000
      lnstab     0.4344   0.3425  -0.0127   0.3372  -0.2185   0.3700   1.0000
        lncc     0.4983   0.5790   0.1276   0.5930   0.2445   1.0000
        lnrl     0.0092   0.2847  -0.1187   0.0682   1.0000
        lnrq     0.3504   0.2230   0.1519   1.0000
        lnge     0.0228   0.0136   1.0000
        lnpv     0.4521   1.0000
        lnva     1.0000
                                                                                                                                                              
                   lnva     lnpv     lnge     lnrq     lnrl     lncc   lnstab   lncons   lngete    lnreg   lngetc   lnprot    lntax  lntrade    lnenf    lninv
Voice and accountability (lnva) 1.81** 
Political stability and absence of violence (lnpv) -4.93*** 
Government effectiveness (lnge) -.94 
Regulatory quality (lnrq) .40 
Rule of law (lnrl) -3.85*** 
Control of corruption (lncc) .10 
Ease of doing business   
Starting a business (lnstab) 3.30*** 
Construction permits (lncons) .80* 
Getting electricity (lngete) -.61 
Registering property (lnreg) -1.79*** 
Getting credit (lngetc) .01 
Protecting minority investors (lnprot) -.69 
Paying taxes (lntax) 1.44** 
Trading across borders (lntrade) .14 
Enforcing contracts (lnenf) 1.69* 
Resolving insolvency (lninv) -.04 
Note: *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Source: own computation 
Table 4: Results of regression with fixed effects model 
 
Government effectiveness: The estimation results show an insignificant relationship 
between government effectiveness and China's FDI stock, and therefore, H1 was not 
supported. This finding means that Chinese investors do not concern government 
efficiency in terms of location decision. This finding contradicts those of much 
empirical research, such as Buchanan, Le, and Rishi (2012)and Gani (2007), but it is in 
line with Naudé and Krugell (2007). One possible explanation is that, according to PRS 
Group (2016), in 2016, China's government effectiveness index is 0.50 which is rather 
low compared with other industrialised countries investors (United States: 1.00; United 
Kingdom: 1.00; France: 0.75). In the same year, the mean of the index across 22 African 
countries is 0.39, which is rather similar to China’s figure. As a result, Chinese investors 
may not concern the government effectiveness as much as other industrialised FDI 
sources do and  
 
Control of corruption: The estimation results indicate that corruption is not significant 
in explaining the inflow of China’s OFDI to African countries. As a result, this result 
cannot support H2. This finding confirms the results by Habib and Zurawicki (2002), 
Shan et al. (2018) and Gu (2009) that Chinese investors do not concern the corruption 
level of the host countries. It is contrary to the work by Asiedu (2006), Cheung et al. 
(2012), and Kwok and Tadesse (2006). A possible explanation of the unexpected result 
is that China has a high level of corruption and therefore, as Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
explain earlier, Chinese investors can take full advantages of bribery to gain their 
benefits, such as the entry of markets which cannot be achieved by regulation 
formalisation. Therefore, there is still an opportunity for those African countries with a 
high level of corruption to attract FDI from China. However, this finding does not 
necessarily suggest Africa should ignore the reduction of corruption. Instead, African 
countries should create more formalised procedures and regulations to help Chinese 
investors achieve and also reduce rent-seeking behaviours. 
Starting a business： The estimation results suggest a significant (at the 1% level) and 
positive (3.30) relationship between the starting a business index and China’s FDI. 
Therefore, this finding supports our hypothesis H3. Consequently, we suggest African 
countries should attempt to reduce the “paid-in minimum capital requirement, the 
number of procedures, time and cost for a small-to-medium-sized limited liability 
company to start up and formally operate in economy’s largest business city.” 
Dealing with construction permits：The results indicate that dealing with construction permits 
index is significantly and positively correlated with China's FDI inflow. It confirms the H4 and 
suggests that every 1% of the change in China's FDI stock can be explained by 0.79% of the change 
of dealing with construction permits. It is understandable that if, in a host country, it takes fewer 
costs and time to obtain an official construction permit, Chinese investors are more likely to choose 
this country and more willing to establish greenfield projects. Therefore, African countries should 
reduce the minimum requirements and procedures for Chinese investors to speed up the process of 
obtaining the necessary licences and permits. 
Getting electricity：Table 4.1 indicates no significant correlation between getting electricity and 
China’s FDI. Thus, H9 is not supported. This finding means Chinese investors do not concern the 
ease of getting electricity when deciding the investment destination. It runs counter to the expected 
results for this variable (The World Bank, 2018b) and (Geginat & Ramalho, 2015). As an essential 
variable for FDI inflows in most literature, we do not expect this finding. One possible explanation 
is that most Chinese firms investing in natural resources and strategic sectors, such as oil or 
infrastructure, are owned by states. The Chinese government provides substantial financial and 
institutional support for those firms. Furthermore, the government should be easier to negotiate with 
the host countries with more reliable and less costly electricity connection than those investors from 
industrialised countries. As a result, Chinese investors do not see the getting electricity as an issue 
as the government has done most of the work for them. 
Getting credit： The estimation results show no significant correlation between the African 
country getting credit index and China’s FDI inflow. Therefore, we find no evidence to support H7. 
Getting credit measure how easy for investors to obtain credits which are a significant financial 
resource for firms’ growth. We find that the ease of getting credit in African countries cannot 
influence the location of China’s OFDI and this is contrary with the findings by Morris and Aziz 
(2011)and The World Bank (2018b). As analysed earlier, most of the Chinese outbound investors 
are state-owned enterprise, and the significant financial support from the Chinese government 
makes Chinese investors care less about the source of funds than investors from developed countries 
do. However, this does not suggest that African countries do not need to enhance their credit 
reporting systems to reduce the uncertainty for the lender to provide funds for enterprises. As Chen, 
Dollar, and Tang (2015) assert, profits are the most important driver for most private investors from 
China. Therefore, developing an environment with secure credit protecting can help Chinese 
investors access required funds for their growth, to promote the inflow of future FDI from China. 
 
Paying taxes： The estimation results indicate that paying taxes is significantly and positively 
correlated with China's FDI inflow. It is evident to support H9. The results also show that a 1% 
increase in host countries paying taxes index is positively associated with 1.44% change in China's 
OFDI stock in those countries. This finding is in line with current studies by The World Bank 
(2018c), Bird (2010), Baumol et al. (2007), Summers et al. (1981) and Barro (1991) and Djankov 
et al. (2010). Chinese investors seem to concern local taxes tremendously when deciding their 
investment location. This suggests that African countries should reasonably design their tax rates 
and improve their tax administration, such as keeping tax simple and effective tax administration 
through risk-based audits as suggested by The World Bank (2018c). 
 
5.0 Conclusion and future implications 
While e-gov can influence many aspects of institutional aspects, such as government effectiveness 
and control of corruption, this study tried to explore whether applying e-gov in African countries 
can help them attract FDI from China. By exploring the individual effects of multiple institutional 
quality factors on FDI, this research linked the relationship between e-gov and FDI inflows.  
 
For policymakers of African countries. As this study provides essential insight on how e-gov in host 
countries can affect the institutional quality and further influence China's ODI flows to African 
countries, those policymakers of African countries should take full advantages of the key findings 
to attract more FDI from China. Due to the scarcity of resources is the underlying assumption of 
economic theory, the governments of African countries should use the limited resources to focus on 
those factors which can significantly influence China's ODI. For example, according to the 
estimation results, Chinese investors do not seem to concern the effectiveness of government and 
the corruption level in host countries as much as other industrialised countries. Therefore, African 
countries should not adopt the e-gov system for merely increasing their government effectiveness 
and reducing the corruption level. On the contrary, those investors from China do concern the ease 
of actually setting up and operating businesses, such as the ease of starting a new business and 
paying taxes. Therefore, African policymakers should invest and develop the infrastructure and 
software system to make setting up businesses and paying taxes easier to attract more FDI from 
China.  
 
For future studies, researchers are encouraged to gather more data and explore the effect of 
institutional quality on these two types of Chinese investors respectively, and this would provide 
valuable knowledge for African countries on how to attract different Chinese investors.  Second, 
there is very little literature on the effect of dealing with construction permits and registering 
property on FDI. The ease and costs of obtaining construction permits and registering are essential 
for foreign investment, particularly the greenfield projects. According to UNCTAD (2018), the 
number of China’s greenfield projects dropped slightly since 2015. Increasing the scores of these 
two indices may stimulate the inflows of China’s FDI. Thus, future studies should pay more 
attention to both theory and empirical research on these two indices and their effects on import, 
export and FDI inflow. Third, we motivate future researchers to gather more updated datasets with 
more countries and a more extended period for more accurate estimation results. The panel data this 
research used is for 22 countries over ten years period. Therefore, more cross-sectional samples and 
the more extended term can add more complete and dynamic insight to literature and provide more 
accurate implications for policymakers of Africa and China. 
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